Tuesday 5 November 2013

# 5 Enbridge pipeline, unanswered questions

Enbridge pipeline, unanswered questions.

On November 6th the Enbridge pipeline was in the news again and it was stressed that acceptance by the public and in particular by the First Nations is of prime importance. In my 3 emails to the government and Enbridge I have stressed that far more details on the development of this project should be readily available to the public. A lot of positive information on pipelines and carbon tax is hidden on websites and blogs, leaving the general public in the dark on what is happening. On September 1st I sent Enbridge a copy of my article “the economic impact of carbon tax”, which is now in the firsts part of my blog. On September 10th Enbridge replied “thank you Neil, we appreciate your support” You will note that under point 13 many rules and regulations are discussed along with some explanation about what went wrong in the past. I hereby repeat the unanswered questions as I saw them:

14  Pipeline and Tanker transport details yet to be clarified

The general public opposes the Northern Gateway project because few details of the project can be found in newspapers magazines and official bulletins. Below are a number of points which have to be answered before the public can gain more confidence that this project will be much safer than any previous undertakings:

a)     Leak detection using internal sensors

Ten days before the Kalamazoo spill Enbridge had told the federal regulators that they could shut down the line in 8 minutes but yet it took 17 hours.(EP10). Has Enbridge since that time done regular tests by creating artificial spills as discussed at the Kitimat hearing?(EP26,27). Has it been confirmed that the instruments can’t detect a leak smaller than 1.5% of the flow? What is the average response time for more severe leaks? For the Kitimat line how often and at how many locations will such tests been done?

b)      Leak detection using external instruments

Enbridge improved the leak detection system of their Michigan line by installing external sensors.(EP26). What type of sensors are these and how small are the leaks they can detect? Enbridge does a lot of research work in leak detection (EP29), yet they don’t release any information of how sensitive some of the options, like the Westminster acoustic system (EP 20,21) (EP28) are. They mention that there are many vendors from which they will make a selection.(EP45).Surely those venders have some test data for their products and an overview could be given about the capabilities  This lack of details has frustrated the BC Environment Minister (EP 27) and is certainly something which makes the public wonder if there will be hidden surprises.

c)       Previous leaks and new pipeline regulations

 It seems logical to have a summary explanation of all recent major spills. These are 2012 Wisconsin (190,000 litres) 2012 Red Deer (230,000 litres), 2011 Stingray (gas),2010 Kalamazoo( 3 megalitres) (EP6). Were the design criteria for these lines different than those of the Canadian Energy Pipeline  Association (EP 31). How old were those lines, how often were they inspected and most importantly how would the spills have been prevented had the present regulations and proposed technology been in place. Are the Canadian regulations as strict as the new US regulations. A summary of the present regulations in particular the maintenance requirements seems useful to satisfy the public that things have changed as a result of all those spills.

d)     Explanation of regulatory violations

In 2008 Enbridge incurred over 500 regulatory violations in one year during pipeline installation in Wisconsin.(EP6). What type of violations were those? Was Enbridge not aware of these regulations or was there insufficient oversight, How are regulations for a new project researched, recorded and included in bid documents for contractors who do work on the project? It is noted that on the same project Enbridge had to pay $1.1 million to settle a lawsuit related to over 100 environmental violations. They violated numerous permits resulting in impacts on wetlands and navigable waterways. (EP59) Is Enbridge aware of all the BC regulations and will they be listed to allow all workers to know about them. Are they included in their design and proposed construction methods?

e)     Cracks detection tools

The NTSB report about the Kalamazoo spill shows that the tools used to measure cracks were inadequate for the type of cracks in pipeline 6B.(EP20) Why were these tools inadequate, what are the presently available tools, how accurate are they? SGS uses a pig to measure all types of weld defects (EP49-50), NDT uses pigs and crawlers(EP 49). What equipment will Enbridge use for the Kitimat project. Are those tools used by many other companies and what is their experience? How often will the lines be checked for cracks?

f)      Isolation valves

With reference to 13 j) above the public will want to know what is the maximum spill which could occur in each section of the line. Many people may not realize that when a section between two isolation valves has several up and down segments only one segment will be emptied when the leak is at the lowest point of that segment. The worst spill can occur when the leak is at the bottom of a hill just ahead of the isolation valve or anywhere in a perfectly horizontal segment.

g)      Earthquake considerations
  
Like buildings, pipelines can be designed to withstand earthquakes. An Alaska line was designed to withstand up to 20 feet lateral and up to 10 feet vertical movements at known fault lines. In 2002 it withstood a magnitude 7.9 earthquake.(EP37). Also note that the Westminster leak detection system monitors vibrations and acoustic at every metre of the pipeline(EP20) and can detect landslides and earthquakes(EP23). Enbridge describes their earthquake and tsunami strategies in a 29 October 2012 blog (EP50-51) and a summary should be published to ensure that the public is aware that Enbridge has already done quite some pre- engineering work on
this important aspect.

h)     Tanker selection and sea conditions

At the hearings Captain Walsh gave several reasons why 20 year old tankers, which are double hulled vessels at the end of their service life, should not be used (EP6). Transport Canada approved the use of 20 year old vessels (EP8). Will Enbridge avoid using such old ships considering that tanker design has changed since that time (CT27,28) Captain Walsh also felt that more pilots and tugs were required and that details were missing about the treatment of ballast.(EP7). How has that been resolved?

Mr Sweeny, a retired naval commander reported sea conditions which rolled his ship 60 degrees to port and another 20,000 ton ship nearly stood on her nose.(EP3). This must have been very unusual conditions which can with present weather forecasting be avoided. Even without good forecasting Alcan’s bulk carriers must have made thousands of trips through these waters. For well over 50 years they shipped alumina powder, the raw material for their smelter, from the West Indies to Kitimat. Their logbooks could give an insight of the sea conditions. There are documentaries of huge tankers being towed and nudged  through Alaska waters by powerful tugs. How comparable is that operation to the present proposal?  Have there been any spills? A US Coast Guard report shows that between 1991 and 2004 roughly36% of spills came from ships and barges, 28% from facilities, 9% from pipelines, 20% from non tank vessels, 7% from mystery spills and only 5% from oil tankers.(CT 28). Are there any later figures available?

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